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Abstract 
 
The transition to a green economy is arguably the most important 
economic transformation of the next decades. To be completed it 
requires the mobilization of astounding resources, a flow of 
technological innovation and a whole series of new rules going from 
technical standards to financial regulation. Given the resources it needs, 
the transition, to be credible, requires a full engagement of the financial 
system. On this regard we analyze the policy set-up of Europe, the most 
advanced area on the issue. We identify a three-layer functioning of the 
EU project for transition. The first one (“green products”) is fully 
compatible with the present financial system. A second layer entails 
changes in the business model and organization of financial operators 
but it can be phased in with minor overhauls. Finally, there is a third 
layer, largely incompatible with the present financial system, yet crucial 
to achieve transition. We show that, according to the same EU analysis, 
the transition needs a total change in the financial landscape and 
therefore it is, rebus sic stantibus, intrinsically unfeasible. We suggest 
ways to escape the dilemma that connects financial stability and green 
economy. 
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1. Introduction: the systemic dimension, finance and 
environment* 
 
The 2008 crisis marked a turning point in modern history, showing how 
mistaken were mainstream theories and ensuing policy prescriptions. 
For a moment the establishment was left in what Greenspan described as 
“a state of shocked disbelief” (Andrews, 2008). Although as soon as 
banking panic was tamed and markets regained their temper, the shock 
faded away and the old habits returned, some lessons have been learned. 
One of the most precious lesson is that systemic risk had been strongly 
undervalued (Stiglitz, 2010). It is now clear that banking concentration 
and financialization entailed a massive growth of systemic risk that was 
not intercepted by micro-prudential tools and mainstream models 
(Galati and Moessner, 2011). Systemic risk is now widely studied in its 
nature and many proposals are coming out on how to measure and to 
tame it (Acharya et al. 2010; Esposito, 2013; Zlatic et al., 2015), 
prudential requirements on globally systemic banks being an example of 
this trend (BCBS, 2014). In this framework, systemic risk has been 
analyzed also as a negative externality, so that, for instance, pigovian 
taxes on big banks have been proposed (Dia and VanHoose, 2013; de 
Mooij and Nicodème eds., 2014). 
During the unfolding of the world financial crisis, we saw a growing 
awareness of another threat to the world economy: climate change 
(UNEP, 2011). If the crisis has shown the importance of ensuring 
financial stability, extreme weather events and climate change are 
emerging as another systemic risk for the world economy (WEF, 2017). 
Together financial stability and green transformation will be two of the 
main drivers of the world economy for the coming decades. In this 
context, there is a proliferation of studies on the transition to a green 
economy (OECD, 2015)1. What emerges from these analyses is a deep 
                                                 
* This paper has been developed at the Department of Economic Policy, Università 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan. The authors wish to thank Andrea Molocchi and 
the participants to the seminar of the 26th October 2018 at the 59th Annual 
Conference of the Società Italiana degli Economisti (Bologna) for helpful 
discussions on these issues. 
The views expressed by Lorenzo Esposito do not involve the responsibility of the 
Bank of Italy.
1 From now on, by “transition” we mean the transition to a green economy. 
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connection between the two aspects (“green finance”2). Many studies try 
to assess how the financial sector can help the transition (ESRB 2016; 
G20 2016; PRA 2015). On a theoretical level, they are trying to analyse 
how the production and management of a public good (financial 
stability) can help the production of another public good (a healthy 
environment). In this paper we try to give a contribution to this aim 
analyzing the EU framework for sustainable finance, to assess if and 
how it helps the transition. 
 
2. The landscape: climate change, green economy, sustainable 
finance 
 
Although a structured discussion on climate change is a relatively recent 
issue (the First World Climate Conference was held in 1979, and the 
Second not until 1990) there are historical antecedents dating from the 
French scientist Jean-Baptiste Fourier who identified the greenhouse 
effect in 1827 (Evans and Steven, 2008). In the 50s the dangers of 
pollution became apparent, especially for some glaring episodes like the 
1953 ‘killer smog’ in London that showed how pollution could cause 
thousands of deaths in just a few days. However, the connection with a 
rise in the average temperatures was detected only thanks to the high-
accuracy measurements of atmospheric CO2 concentration, initiated by 
Keeling in 1958 that “constitute the master time series documenting the 
changing composition of the atmosphere” (Le Treut et al., 2007). The 
Keeling measurements at the Mauna Loa observatory in Hawaii showed 
an indisputable annual increase, revealing an average warming of 0.5-
0.6C over the last 150 years (Harding, 2007). In the 80s other 
environmental issues came to the fore (acid rain and the ‘ozone hole’ 
over Antarctica, which led to the 1987 Montreal Protocol). In 1988 the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up by the 
World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) to coordinate researches on global 
climate change.  
                                                 
2 See, for instance, the website of the EC on the topic: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-
finance_en. 
7 
It is interesting to note that at the beginning, a strong and effective 
lobbying activity was directed against the IPCC; through the years, large 
companies understood that a green reputation was a good marketing 
strategy3. So at the end of the 90s, one after the other, they changed 
direction and in 2002 the GCCC, the umbrella lobby group against the 
IPCC, was disbanded (Evans and Steven, 2008). In 1992, the UN 
Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC4) was adopted at the Rio 
Earth Summit. The framework called for action aimed at stabilizing 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to avoid “dangerous 
anthropogenic (human-emitted) interference with the climate system”. 
The UNFCCC came into force on 21th March 1994. In 1995 there was 
the first Conference of the Parties (COP for short) to review the 
implementation of UNFCCC; the first meetings (COP1) were held in 
Berlin, followed by subsequent conferences almost every year (Sinha, 
2015, UNFCCC 1995). The proof of the new attitude by governments as 
well as firms and the public opinion was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
(COP3) that set binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the 
European Union to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by roughly 5% 
below 1990 levels by 2012.  
It is important to point out that “Kyoto was a battle between 
countries with different interests and priorities” (Evans and Steven, 
2008). This was true not only between developed and developing 
countries but also among advanced economies, especially between the 
two shores of the Atlantic. In fact, although the Kyoto Protocol was 
signed by the US President Clinton, in 2001 President George W. Bush 
withdrew the United States from the Protocol due to concerns that 
limiting greenhouse gas emissions would harm the US economy. This 
was only the first of US about-turns on the issue. The last one was in 
June 2017, when President Trump announced his intention to withdraw 
the United States from the Paris Agreement (the COP21)5, signed by 
President Obama, with the aim of keeping global warming below 2°C. 
 
                                                 
3 For an example on how the financial system now deals with this marketing 
strategy, see VV AA, Banking on Climate Change, 2018. 
4 See the website: www.unfccc.int. 
5 See the UN website on the issue ttp://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php, 
see also http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21. 
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Nowadays, the problem is largely considered as one of the most if not 
the most important facing humankind. The scale of the task is immense: 
“The 2014 New Climate Economy Report estimates that some US$90 
trillion will be needed between 2015 and 2030 to achieve global 
sustainable development and climate objectives” (GFT, 2018). A UNEP 
2011 Report put the costs to world economy at US$6.6 trillion for 2008 
that will grow to 28.6 trillion in 2050 (18% of the world GDP). But 
delaying action is even worse: “in the absence of further action to tackle 
climate change, the combined negative effect on global annual GDP 
could be between 1.0% and 3.3% by 2060. As temperatures could 
continue to rise to a projected 4°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, 
GDP may be hurt by between 2% and 10% by the end of the century 
relative to the no-damage baseline scenario” (OECD, 2015). Some 
sectors and countries are going to pay more. For instance: “changes in 
crop yields and in labour productivity are projected to have the largest 
negative consequences” (ibid.). 
This last observation is useful to make it clear that, besides the 
impressive absolute dimension of the problem, transition entails 
“distributive and intergenerational justice issues” (Cass, 2010). For 
instance, climate change will harm some areas more (typically Africa 
and Asia and coastal areas; OECD, 2015) while others could be even 
positively affected (FAO, 2017, pp. 39 and following). Should the latter 
compensate the former? There is no legal basis for this compensation. 
Secondly, there is a social redistribution effect due to pollution in 
general and to climate change in particular. For instance in Italy, 
households pay 70% more of the external costs they produce, firms 26% 
less and there are differences also among economic sectors (Molocchi, 
2017). The scale of the problem and its multifaceted consequences 
explain why the UNEP was created, although without much power to 
act, so far. 
An important part of the transition is how to engage the financial 
system, and in particular, the banking sector (Batten et al., 2016). The 
connections between finance and transition are manifold and sometimes 
complicated to detect. Anyway, the idea of sustainable finance is gaining 
traction with the idea of financing investments that take into account 
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environmental, social and governance considerations6. Banks can help 
to finance the transition and indeed they have to, because climate change 
also yields financial disruption. In fact, the importance of the topic has 
pushed central banks and financial intermediaries to analyse the 
“transition risk” that, if not tackled, could lead to a “climate Minsky 
moment” (Scott et al., 20177). Connections between finance and 
transition confirm the wealth redistribution effects of climate change. 
For instance, a swift change in the energy mix of world economy would 
disrupt many economic sectors: decarbonization “would shift the 
economic balance of some countries and change the business models of 
several industries” (Covington, 2017). Should they be compensated or 
simply left going in default? The fact that the transition risk is 
completely undetected by equity markets can be explained either by the 
fact that markets are not efficient or by the fact they don’t believe in a 
rapid transition (Silver 2017, Thomä and Chenet, 2017). Probably both 
explanations are true. 
Besides the general topic of sustainable finance, due to the 
differences on how environment is changed by human activities, the 
UNFCCC proposed the idea of climate finance that is a framework 
where developed country parties are to provide financial resources to 
assist developing country parties in implementing the objectives of the 
UNFCCC8. The Paris Agreement established a financial mechanism to 
provide financial resources to developing country parties starting with a 
Green Climate Fund that has a present commitment of $3.7 billion9. 
How to fund the green economy will be a core aspect of international 
finance in the next years. Therefore sustainable finance is at the core of 
the transition. 
Pollution is one of the most emblematic examples of negative 
externality (Stiglitz, 2000). Typically, governments tackle it using price 
mechanism (the “carbon tax”10). Sustainable finance is a different way 
                                                 
6 See Rezende de Carvalho Ferreira et al., 2016 for a survey on socially and 
environmentally concerned investment practices. 
n transition risk see also Batten et al., 2016 and, for the Italian scenario, 
Bernardini et al., 2017.
8 On the issue see: https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/the-big-
picture/introduction-to-climate-finance.  
9 See its website: https://www.greenclimate.fund/home.  
10 For an application to Italy, see Faiella and Cingano, 2015. 
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to change relative prices using funding costs as a lever. What is needed 
is a general policy to connect all these tools. A point in favor of using 
finance instead of taxes is that changing the relative price of funding 
green projects could prevent the externality to be produced; after all, no 
economic sector can exist without a proper funding by the banking 
system. This conclusion is also connected to legal consequences. In fact, 
there is a growing literature on the banks’ environment responsibility 
(the so called sustainable lending, Bouma et al., 2001) that deals with 
the direct legal costs and with reputational risks coming from funding of 
controversial projects and firms (Ulph and Valentini, 2004; Aspromonte 
and Molocchi, 2014). The idea of “lender liability” is also part of many 
laws such as the US 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (Bearden, 2012, see also Wolford, 
2014), the 1993 Lugano Convention (EC, 1993) and the UK 1995 
Environment Act (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2014). Although in a 
negative way, these laws confirm the importance of the connections 
between the banking system and transition. 
 
3. The three layers of EU intervention on sustainable finance 
 
Europe is at the forefront of the fight against climate change, having put 
sustainability at the core of its development strategy. The starting point 
is the need to re-orientate public and private financial flows towards 
green and sustainable efforts. Tools like the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI) or the Capital Markets Union Action Plan are 
already there, but much more is needed. To develop an overall vision of 
sustainable finance, European Commission decided to appoint a High-
Level Expert Group “to help develop an overarching and comprehensive 
EU roadmap on sustainable finance”. The Group produced an Interim 
Report in 2017 and a Final Report in 201811. As it is clearly stated in 
them, Europe wishes to keep its leadership in sustainable finance. In 
fact, the EU also contributed to the development of the 2030 UN 
Agenda for Sustainable Development where financial issues are 
paramount and the European Commission released an Action Plan for a 
greener economy based on the recommendations of the Group (Press 
Release, 8th March 2018). Afterwards, the EC delivered the first 
                                                 
11 From now on IR and FR. 
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concrete actions to enable the EU financial sector to help the transition 
(Press Release, 24th May 2018). Finance is an essential lever for 
achieving transition and the EU connects the transition to ambitious 
goals such as economic prosperity, social inclusion and environmental 
regeneration. Of course it is difficult to disentangle European 
institutions’ genuine care for the environment from propaganda in an 
epoch of trade wars. After all, austerity has meant misery for tens of 
millions of European households and one can doubt about Europe’s 
concern for the future of environment when it doesn’t seem to care for 
the present poverty of its citizens. In its turn, misery yielded a 
worsening of pollution, especially in Greece (Fuller, 2016), therefore 
more austerity meant more pollution. Anyway, especially after the 
signature of the Paris agreement on 2015, EU put itself at the forefront 
of the shift towards a low-carbon society, with its pledge to reduce CO2 
emissions by 40% in all economic sectors by 2030. 
For the transition to be completed the full resources of society will 
have to be mobilized. The scale of the investment challenge in the EU 
analysis “is well beyond the capacity of the public sector alone” (FR, p. 
2). This statement seems factual, but in reality it comes from a political 
choice. As the crisis has shown, if deemed important, public sector 
resources can be mobilized to the full to tame the storm, i.e. to save the 
banks. For instance, between September 2008 and December 2010 the 
Commission authorized aid for an overall drawable amount of €4.3 
trillion that was almost a third of the EU GDP (Millaruelo and del Río, 
2017), a sum even higher than what is needed to kickstart the transition. 
Clearly, for European authorities transition is not as important as saving 
big banks. Therefore, public resources available are tiny (for instance 
the EFSI has generated about €90 billion of investment into energy, 
environment and resource efficiency) and the transition will need 
financial markets. However, the financial system has proved to be quite 
reckless in the last decade, therefore, to lead the way in the transition, 
EU needs “no less than a transformation of the entire financial system, 
its culture, and its incentives” (FR, p. 2). The problem is the huge gap 
between this general proclamation on the importance of sustainable 
finance and the practical proposals coming out from the very same 
reports. In particular, we can detect three different layers of sustainable 
finance based on an assessment made by the very same EU experts, that, 
in the Interim Report, proposed this tripartite definition (IR, p. 12): 
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Basing ourselves on these different definitions of sustainable finance, 
we analyse the EU Reports to see their contradictory nature and to 
propose alternatives. 
 
3.1. The good: rules and green products 
 
The first most superficial level by which sustainable finance is 
connected to transition is what the IR calls “integrating 
environmental…factors in financial decisions”. This means a series of 
rules to improve something that is already under way, for instance norms 
on disclosure, corporate governance, reporting and so on that have been 
for many years part of financial regulation. Basically all the “early 
recommendations” of the IR are in this layer. They are part of the re-
regulation wave born to answer the 2008 crisis and they suffer from the 
same problem: they go in the right direction but not rapidly enough to 
prevent another crisis because they do not change the basic tenets of 
banks’ business model (Mastromatteo and Esposito, 2016, p. 43). 
One of these rules deals with green financial products. The proposal 
is that the EU should introduce an official Green Bond Standard and a 
Green Bond label to help the development of green products. The aim is 
to promote “green finance” that, in this context, is like a new product 
line as other “eco-friendly” commodities. It is a good marketing move 
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and it makes sense also on a regulatory basis. Banks and asset managers 
can sell green products without changing a thing to their business model 
exactly like a superstore can sell vegan food besides meat and poultry. 
This is not a secondary development: green economy funding gap is still 
conspicuous (OECD, 2011) not only in bank lending but also in 
securities, with less than 1% of global bonds labeled as green (G20, 
2016, p. 3). Only for the EU, funding gap for the transition is estimated 
at around €180 billion per year (IR, p. 2). The reason why public 
institutions are proposing to mobilize the financial system is that, as we 
said, the dimension of the financial needs is considered beyond the 
capacity of the public sector. Authorities are thus creating a legal 
framework to sell green products. Data confirms that the green fad is 
well under way: “Over US$3.3 trillion of private climate finance has 
been mobilised to date; the global green bond market in 2017 reached 
US$155.4 billion new issuance in the year, compared to US$81.6 billion 
in 2016” (GFT, 2018, p. 11). The creation of benchmarks and market 
indices is also a boost to green products. The “concrete actions” 
proposed by the EC are based on HLEG recommendations and therefore 
are all well inside the layer 1 (taxonomy, disclosure, information to 
clients and so on12). 
The rules on green finance products are used to help the development 
of the market or, to be more precise, the single national markets. Every 
nation is trying to promote its financial hub in a framework of strong 
international competition. This is very clear in the case of UK 
government that explicitly uses green finance to help the City (the GFT 
report links green finance goals to the “consolidation of UK leadership 
in green finance”, p. 59 and following). So much for a cooperative effort 
to decarbonize the world. 
 
3.2. The bad: a green business model 
 
Green products help but they cannot change the landscape of the 
financial system. At least not rapidly enough. Superstores have sold eco-
friendly products for decades but this did not change much in the 
consumers’ behavior until the other products were prohibited or in some 
way strongly discouraged. 
                                                 
12 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3729_en.htm.  
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This is also because consumers cannot pay too much for green 
products, especially in years of crisis, low wages and so on. Moreover, 
the emphasis on “information” is misplaced. It is not sufficient for 
consumers to be informed. For instance, smokers or heavy drinkers 
know that they are basically killing themselves and yet they keep on. By 
the same token, after the crisis, regulators gave a strong importance to 
financial education, but this cannot change much per se. The crisis was 
directly originated by the reckless behavior of big banks CEOs. Are we 
implying that Fuld, Schwartz or other top managers needed financial 
education in the 2000s? Education and information are important, but 
far from enough. Climate change needs much more and at much higher 
speed. We need green regulation able to change things. The second and 
deeper layer of sustainable finance is thus linked to a financial system 
able to foster a sustainable development. In practice, this means a 
regulatory framework able to change the banks’ business model to 
comply with the aims of COP21.  
For finance to be sustainable it needs specific actions by monetary 
policy and by banking regulation with obvious inter-linkages. The 
relation between monetary policy and the transition has been studied as 
far as growth (Barkawi and Monnin, 2015), rules for central banking 
operations (Matikainen et al., 2017) and interest rates setting 
(Rozenberg et al., 2013) are concerned. Before the crisis, monetary 
policy was confined to keeping inflation low. With the crisis, financial 
stability and growth have regained importance. The new role of central 
banks can be seen also in the dimension and composition of their 
balance sheets after many rounds of QEs. Assets connected to 
sustainable finance can be easily put into this picture. What is true for 
central banking is also true for banking regulation. 
The same EU Reports emphasize the role of banking regulation to 
help the transition. The most important point is financial stability. After 
2008 the importance of financial stability has been rediscovered 
(Dombret and Lucius eds., 2013). Besides more traditional factors that 
have been considered, it is now clear that climate change as well can 
derail financial stability because “climate systemic risk is a potential 
source of financial disruption” (Aglietta and Espagne, 2016), for 
instance by destroying the capital of the firm or provoking rapid 
portfolio reallocation (Dafermos et al., 2018). Regulation is also a 
defensive move because the strong uncertainty and the global nature of 
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the transition can hit particularly insurance and banking sector. For 
instance, it has been estimated that the European financial institutions 
are exposed to fossil-fuel firms for more than €1 trillion and to potential 
losses up to €400 billion (ESRB, 2016). The importance of fostering a 
new financial regulation to help transition is made more compelling by 
the fact that the crisis has reduced green economy investment in line 
with the general reduction of credit growth but also for specific reasons 
(Campiglio et al., 2017). Moreover, Basel III has been considered a 
specific cause for the funding gap of the green economy (Liebreich, 
2013, and Narbel, 2013). All in all, financial barriers to the transition are 
mounting (Ghisetti et al., 2017). First of all, there is an issue of 
composition of assets that are distorted towards tangible assets that are 
easier to be pledged as collateral, thus increasing emissions (Andersen, 
2017). Secondly, in a situation of credit crunch or at least risk aversion 
by banks, financing green economy can be considered too dangerous 
and the banks can play it safe funding more traditional technologies, 
entrenching technological lock-ins and old oligopolies (Ghisetti et al., 
2015). 
Although the importance of financial regulation is clear, so far the 
proposals have been poor (for instance a more structured corporate 
disclosure and a specific design of stress tests, Villeroy de Galhau, 2015; 
see also ICBC 2014, and Signorini, 2017, and on how to integrate 
sustainability into accounting standards, the IR). All these proposals can 
be considered layer 1 issues, because they are not able to change 
significantly bank’s business model. What is needed to this aim is 
prudential supervision. In fact, European authorities are exploring how 
to incorporate sustainability factors into the Basel II supervisory review 
process. In order to help the transition, the creation of specific prudential 
tools has also been suggested, although the measures that have come out 
so far concerned reserve requirements, not prudential supervision 
(Campiglio, 2014, and Rozenberg et al. 2013). Suggestions on lowering 
minimum capital requirements for green assets are starting to emerge 
(IR, pp. 32 and 62 and the “green supporting factor” of the FR). 
Recently, Esposito, Mastromatteo and Molocchi (2018), proposed to 
modify the banks’ assets weights used for capital requirements to 
internalize the pollution risk of the borrower. Thus prudential regulation 
would move from the present risk weighted assets to environment-risk 
weigthed assets. The proposal aims to allow financial regulation to take 
16 
into account important relationships between pollution and credit. 
ERWAs entails a deep change in regulation and therefore in the business 
model of the banks. It is an example of how it is possible to push the 
financial system to be functional to the transition although very 
gradually.  
 
3.3. The ugly: a green world 
 
Transition is such a momentous goal with repercussions on every aspect 
of economic and social life that it is impossible to over-estimate its 
importance. Reflections on its causes and consequences should change 
the way we look at the economy in general. As Mathur and Berwa 
(2017)  put it:  
“The capitalistic ideology of unabated growth leading to 
amelioration of the greatest ills of humanity – poverty – via the 
trickledown theory has ceased to bear fruit. The dismal condition of 
world’s poor, rising global social unrest, mass exploitation of the 
ecosystem, global warming, depletion of natural resources and 
deterioration of environment, are causes of grave concern today. As we 
look ahead, we recognize the necessity to build the foundation of a new 
era of sustainability” 
To bring about this new era, deep reflections on the present economy 
are needed. There are important observations in the Reports that hints at 
the scale of change needed to make the transition real and that go far 
beyond climate change issues. For instance: “Reflecting these concerns, 
building a fairer Europe and strengthening its social dimension have 
become a priority for the Commission…The financial system should be 
a vehicle for promoting these objectives by embedding social and other 
sustainability considerations into capital allocation, and by promoting 
more socially sustainable approaches to finance” (IR, p. 85). How this is 
compatible with the general economic policy that rules Europe is at least 
unclear. Anyway, the EU boldly identifies problems with the present 
financial system. In particular this is true for the core point of the time-
life of investment. Transition implies long term investment. 
Unfortunately, financial markets are going in the opposite direction. 
This is an old theme dating at least since the discussion of the “beauty 
contest” in Keynes’ General Theory. In fact, analyzing financial 
markets, Keynes observed that modern capitalism is based on the 
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separation of ownership and control of the enterprises. The separation 
implies that the capital markets have a key influence on investment and 
hence on business cycles, that are based on investment waves. Capital 
markets allow for a far wider funding of the firms, thus facilitating 
investment, but they also increase instability because they induce a 
continuous re-assessment of assets value. Therefore, institutional 
investors yield higher volume of credit at firm’s disposal but also “short-
termism” in the financial markets (Whalen, 2017). The frequent rotation 
of managers among firms also make corporate strategies more alike 
(Pasinetti, 2009). This means that green “sectors” or “firms” are more a 
marketing strategy than a true specific business model. All in all there is 
an increase in uncertainty and short-termism (Mazzucato and Penna, 
2015) that plays against transition that is by definition a long term plan 
(because “sustainable finance is axiomatically linked to the long term”, 
IR, p. 9). 
Reports are aware of this fact: “Recent trends suggest that short-
termism in the financial sector may have got worse, with the average 
holding period of market-traded assets becoming shorter” (FR, p. 46) 
and therefore: “The HLEG sees short-termism as a clear challenge and 
potential obstacle for the establishment of a sustainable financial system 
and has already highlighted the issue in its interim report” (FR, p. 47). 
This aspect can doom the whole project, so we would expect courageous 
measure to face it, but this is how concretely EU tackles the issue: “The 
policy priorities should therefore be to lengthen the time horizon and 
broaden the conception of risk” (IR, p. 19), of course but how? The 
reality is more sober: “There is no single parameter that could switch off 
‘short-termism’ and move finance to the long term, aligning it with all 
the major economic challenges that demand a long-term perspective. 
Nevertheless, progress can be made through, first, continued emphasis 
by policy-makers that what is needed in particular is long-term finance” 
(IR, p. 20, emphasis added). Other suggestions are added (on financial 
literacy, social awareness, accounting issues on the IFRS 9), but how all 
this can confront short-termism is beyond any imagination. The Reports 
do not put up any feasible way to face the issue.  
Financial markets are based on short-termism and this feature is 
unassailable, but there is an economic player that can be more interested 
in long term: the State. EU and others have endorsed the idea of a 
public-private partnership, although the content of this relation is 
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unclear to be polite. If we should base our judgment on the historical 
partnership between the State and financial operators the result would be 
even too obvious: the public takes the losses and the private takes the 
profits as it happened before and after the 2008 crisis. There are 
indications of the same game played in sustainable finance. For instance 
in 2012 the UK government created a Green Investment Bank that in 
2017 was sold to private investors13. So much for long term. 
The problem is that EU Reports (and more generally international 
reports on climate change) try to please everyone, thus confining 
themselves to mountains producing mice. They sell the general scenario 
of a green economy to the public opinion but the concrete proposals are 
safely inside the layer 1 to keep banks and large firms on board. In 
particular, if we look at the recommendations to single operators (banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, etc.) they are all vague enough to 
be in the layer 1 (for instance “Asset managers should ensure that their 
governance, expertise and stewardship practices take account of 
sustainability in order to deliver the best possible investment outcome 
for clients”). They are ambitious (“Putting sustainability at the heart of 
the financial system”, IR p. 5) but only in words. 
 
3.4 Other Institutions’ Recommendations 
 
We criticized the EU ambiguity on sustainable finance and its causes but 
we must also observe that EU is far from being alone in this attitude. 
Let’s see three of the more important examples. 
The FSB-G20 Task Force on sustainable finance in its Final Report, 
developed recommendations around four thematic areas that represent 
core elements of financial intermediary organizations: governance, 
strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets (TCFD, 2017, pp. 13 
and following) but they are simple disclosure proposals of no effect 
whatsoever. For instance, for strategy the Report states: “Disclose the 
actual and potential impacts of climate-related risks and opportunities on 
the organization’s businesses, strategy, and financial planning where 
such information is material”. All well inside layer 1 to say the least. 
                                                 
13 See the announcement of UK government: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-governments-sale-of-green-investment-
bank-completed.  
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The UK Commission on the issue (the Green Finance Task Force) in 
its report to government, has proposed vague recommendations (GFT, 
2018, pp. 21 and following) that basically aims at fending competition 
against UK financial system. For instance: “Government and the City of 
London should establish a new Green Finance Institute brand under 
which strengthened and rebranded Green Finance Initiative capacity is 
established”, although it cites “More ambitious reforms for the future”, 
this refers to the relationship of the country with the EU after Brexit. 
The UN Environment Programme has issued a Green Finance 
Progress Report (UNEP and MELS, 2017) with 7 options all in the layer 
1; for instance option 4 (“Support the Development of Local Green 
Bond Markets”) and option 5 (“Promote International Collaboration to 
Facilitate Cross border Investment in Green Bonds”). 
The EU reports at least show contradictions because they try to 
overcome the simple recipes of layer 1. 
 
3.5 Commercial banks and climate change 
 
Many commercial banks have put the transition at the centre of their 
marketing and organizational efforts. For instance this is the case of 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (2014) and of HSBC (2018). 
It is interesting to observe that these banks not only make proposal in 
terms of sustainable finance services and products (layer 1) but also in 
terms of changes needed in their organization, hinting at layer 2 issues 
(for instance as far as credit risk stress testing for specific industries, risk 
management and governance are concerned). However, besides product 
differentiation, the emphasis is basically on reputation and marketing 
and it is difficult to detect what is the real endeavor towards transition. 
For instance, HSBC describes in its Annual Report all its projects on 
sustainable finance summed up in the following table (HSBC, 2018, p. 
27): 
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Looking at the table, efforts seem conspicuous but other sources depict a 
different scenario. In the recent report Banking on Climate Change, 
HSBC is shown as one of the “biggest backsliders”, that is banks that 
instead of committing to real reductions, drastically increased their 
extreme fossil fuel financing from 2016 to 2017 (VV AA, 2018, p. 9). 
The Report points out that “If banks like… HSBC continue at these 
levels of financing for extreme fossil fuel projects and companies, they 
must reckon with their complicity in the increased social and economic 
impacts of climate change” (ibidem, p. 20). This is the difference 
between marketing and the real world. 
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4. An alternative perspective on public guidance 
 
The essence of the EU framework for sustainable finance is to convince 
banks and financial markets to endorse transition: private investors are 
considered the key to transition. This is the legacy of decades of laissez-
faire and deregulation that are not put aside, financial crisis 
notwithstanding, even when discussing how to tackle climate change. 
However, we have showed hints of a different road that can be taken.  
The acceleration in the trends of financialized globalization after the 
80s meant also a different role for the State. No more direct production 
of goods but the role of monitoring of what private producers were 
doing. State-owned firms were privatized, the supply of welfare state 
duties were put on private shoulder (pension funds, private healthcare, 
insurance companies and so on). The EU Reports keep this general 
scheme: public authorities set the rules and financial markets fund the 
projects and make the money. 
As we observed, the crisis should have disposed of this set-up or at 
least should have put it into question and should have opened the way 
for a debate on a new role of the State. 
In fact, States have already played a prominent role during the crisis. 
This brings us to the first point of this discussion: is the transition “too 
expensive” to be State-funded? The GFT estimate we already mentioned 
put the financial need at around $90 trillion for 15 years, that is around 
$6 trillion a year (UNEP, 2016, had similar figures). It seems an 
astounding sum, but it should be compared with what the States and 
central banks put up to stop the financial panic after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Calculating the overall intervention is very difficult 
but all the estimates are striking: they go from 6 to 14 trillion (Atkinson 
et al., 2013) and “between USD 60 trillion and USD 200 trillion”, 
(Dombret, in Dombret and Lucius eds., 2013). Only in the US, the 
federal State put at Wall Street disposal almost 24 trillion, 150% of the 
GDP (Johnson and Kwak, 2010). This money was given immediately 
and basically with no string attached. The different rounds of QEs in the 
US, EU, UK, Japan etc., have confirmed the commitment of public 
authorities to financial stability with no limitation or, to use Draghi’s 
words “whatever it takes”.  
The post-2008 events not only show that if the reason is deemed 
important, trillions of public money are mobilized in no time, but also 
22 
that the idea that public debt is bad and private debt is good was 
unilateral to say the least, especially because private debt rapidly end 
like a public problem during crises. Moreover, financial intermediaries 
have proved not particularly able to appraise the actual risk of an asset. 
It is not clear why it should be different with green assets. On the other 
hand, central banks were forced to buy financial assets that were 
uncommon in their balance sheets before the crisis, they could well buy 
400-500 billion of green bond a year with no increase in the overall 
riskiness of their business model, so to speak. 
If dimension and ownership of transition-related financial assets are 
not an issue, one could consider private funding superior for efficiency 
reasons. However, also on this count, traditional wisdom has been 
seriously undermined. First of all, the role of private investors in 
innovation has been proved negligible until the very end, when the 
technology is marketable. Putting aside the fanfare on venture capital, 
momentous innovations that create an industry from scratch are too 
uncertain for private investors: even venture capitalist are not so risk-
loving and they typically enter the scene when the idea is already at a 
pre-commercial testing stage (Mazzucato, 2013, pp. 40 and following). 
We can predict that also for sustainable finance the pattern will be the 
same: private funds will flow only when reliable profits will be at hand. 
Patient capital means public investment: the long-term approach is the 
only way to create new economic sectors, thus stimulating band-
wagoning by private firms and investors. 
Secondly public investment is fashionable again exactly because 
after the crisis private funding is scant. Even “the G-20 has called for 
ramping up public investment to raise long-run economic growth” (IMF, 
2015). Of course, not all public investments are created equal and “the 
economic and social impact of public investment crucially depends on 
its efficiency” (ibid.) but it is easy to argue that funding the transition is 
a very efficient use of public money. 
Besides these points, there are other important reasons that suggest 
public authorities should lead the funding of transition. First of all, 
pollution and climate change do not affect countries and people in the 
same way. There are very different interests and visions on the issue as it 
is clear during related negotiations (Kyoto, Paris, etc.). Only the States 
can find fair solutions to these different needs. Financial markets are 
rightfully not interested in the issue. 
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Secondly, financial markets are ruled by institutional investors that 
are not in the business of long-term investment: “To exaggerate only 
slightly, there are no long-term stockholders anymore” (Crotty, 1990). If 
other business opportunities come out, private investors could withdraw 
at least partially their support to the transition while the overhaul of 
productive system connected to the transition requires a stable flow of 
investment for decades, nor it is thinkable to raise yields of transition-
related financial assets to retain private investors. 
Thirdly, there is a general economic reason why it is totally 
implausible that a sufficient amount of resources will be mobilized 
privately. Climate change is a pervasive negative externality and 
therefore it entails a deep price distortion of most of goods (financial 
products included) having an international market. Carbon taxes and 
other well-known fiscal tools are important. Also taxation based on the 
“polluter pays” criterion is useful in order to incorporate environmental 
externalities into price-setting mechanisms, as indicated in the 
Declaration of Rio de Janeiro Conference on Environment and 
Development (1992)14. However, market tools are not enough to fund 
transition and to change the productive processes in the scale and speed 
needed. 
Moreover, transition means a wider use of renewable energies. Given 
that the sun or the wind are not owned by anyone, differently from oil 
and gas, this could hamper the transition. This is the problem behind the 
discussion of the Coase theorem. Unclear property rights are another 
good reason to rely on public investment. 
Waiting for this public commitment, “Currently, the EU is not on 
track to deliver the €11.2 trillion required to meet its 2030 energy policy 
targets. The latest estimates put the annual investment gap at around 
€177 billion between 2021 and 2030, totalling €1.77 trillion” (IR, p. 13). 
                                                 
14 In particular, according to the principle 16: “National authorities should 
endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in 
principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and 
without distorting international trade and investment” 
(http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm). On the 
application of the “polluter pays principle” to the general issue of environmental 
taxation, see Serrano, 2007; for an application to the Italian scenario, see 
Molocchi, 2017. 
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This gap will not be filled voluntarily by private investors unless their 
return and (implicit) public guarantees on the investment are very high. 
All in all, transition requires an alternative path, with a strong direction 
in the strategy of public intervention, able to deeply change the 
economic landscape in the production strategies. 
 
5. Conclusions: what is missing? How to take transition seriously 
 
Halfway measures simply delay the inevitable disaster – Laudato Sì’, 
Pope Francis  
 
The green transformation of industrial production and of the economy as 
a whole will be one of the most important trends of the century. 
Everybody formally acknowledges it, in particular EU institutions, but 
as we observed, they are not willing to draw the consequences from it, 
although they have at least formally proposed a structured framework to 
deal with the transition. 
As far as theoretical aspects are concerned, EU framework’s 
contradictions are linked to two main points: which role for the State vis 
à vis the markets and, connected to the first, the short vs the long term. 
Before the crisis, in mainstream economics the State was bad: public 
investment, public rules, economic policies were useless relics of the 
past. Laissez-faire the financial markets was the name of the game. After 
financial markets were saved by public resources for trillions, the 
appraisal has become more balanced. But although now public 
investment is cool again, the point is the different role of public vs 
private funds. For instance, transition is a very uncertain business and 
institutional investors dislike uncertainty. Not by chance in Europe a 
pioneering role has been played by public banks: “The first ever green 
bond was issued by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 2007; 
between 2010 and 2014, as the largest climate financier globally, the 
EIB provided more than €90 billion for climate action projects” (IR, p. 
11). The same is true for the ESFI but their bond issuing is still low. 
At the same time, the EU Reports point out that the scale of the 
interventions is beyond the capacity of the public sector alone. However, 
this is not a “factual” statement as we observed. For instance, the ECB 
has expanded its assets by more than €2 trillion due to the QEs. No one 
has predicted this expansion before the crisis. Was the bailing-out of the 
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European banking system “beyond the capacity” of the public sector? It 
is the importance of the goal that decides the commitment of public 
sector resources. Avoiding a financial meltdown was evidently 
considered important enough. The relative weight of public and private 
funds is therefore a political decision and the same is true for the use of 
these funds. It is clear from the EU Reports that public investment will 
be used for the Juncker Plan (infrastructures) “with a particular focus on 
the ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ macro area – since that area accounts 
for the majority of the infrastructure investment gap” (FR, p. 38). The 
general idea is that public fund will prepare the road for private 
investment: “Public support could be key to further foster a societal 
move to adopt sustainable clean technologies”, (Boulatoff and Boyer, 
2017). Therefore, public funds will be used to improve the productivity 
of the German industrial backyard, or to test new technologies until they 
are profitable. After all, we are dealing here with negative externalities, 
and therefore we know that private investors will under-invest in the 
sector unless there are public incentives. This is the very typical public-
private partnership and unfortunately transition is not going to be used 
to change the situation.  
It is interesting to note that here and there in the International 
Reports there are hints of a different perspective. For instance, in the 
UNFCC Document on the Adoption of the Paris Agreement we can read 
of “non-market approaches to sustainable development” (2015, p. 6). 
Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that transition implies a redesign 
of a far wider social context starting from inequality. The same 
document states: “Emphasizing the intrinsic relationship that climate 
change actions, responses and impacts have with equitable access to 
sustainable development and eradication of poverty” (p. 21). The fight 
against climate change is also a fight against poverty. We can find the 
same analysis in the FAO appraisal of climate change (FAO, 2017, Ch. 
4) and it quantifies investment needed for low-income countries in 
roughly 2 percent of global GDP (2017, p. 126). Lacking any viable 
alternative, the only way to find these resources is giving incentives to 
private investors, as it was done to give low-income Americans a house, 
thus giving roots to the subprime bubble. 
In a nutshell, if financial markets rule the roost in sustainable 
finance, they will mold it according to their features. This means, above 
all, short-termism. The IR (p. 5) states correctly: “In the aftermath of the 
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financial and sovereign debt crises, sustainable finance could provide 
the best opportunity for the EU to reorient its financial system from 
short-term stabilization to long-term impact” but how can it be done if 
financial markets are left in command? 
EU Reports are aware of this contradiction. For instance, we can 
read: “Reflecting these concerns, building a fairer Europe and 
strengthening its social dimension have become a priority for the 
Commission” (FR, p. 85). The problem is that the statement comes from 
the institutions that, for instance, imposed a draconian austerity to 
Greece. What kind of “social dimension” has been worked out for the 
Greek population? We can sum up the situation concluding that those 
Reports show a considerable level of confusion. We can read: “The 
financial system should be a vehicle for promoting these objectives by 
embedding social and other sustainability considerations into capital 
allocation, and by promoting more socially sustainable approaches to 
finance” (ibid.) but also “Sustainability cannot develop in a context 
where investment is dominated by short-term considerations” (FR, p. 
45). Which one, then, is the political road to be pursued? 
We see the discussion wandering among layers, that is, between 
helping the creation of new financial products and proposing? A 
different role for finance. At the core of the matter, the point is 
governance, that is a different balance of forces between the State and 
financial markets, or -to be more direct- how to avoid governments 
taking orders from big banks. Financial re-regulation after the crisis will 
not change it. Although many new rules go in the right direction 
(especially as far as liquidity risk and macro-prudential supervision are 
concerned), as we noted the overall business model of big banks has not 
been seriously affected (CFGS, 2018). Sustainable finance could be the 
last chance to regain public control of financial markets, but the chance 
is being dissipated. The fulcrum of the contradiction we are analyzing is 
that a political issue is treated as if it was a technical problem. For sure, 
pollution and climate change in particular have a very sophisticated 
technical aspects to be dealt with, but the core choices are political and 
must be taken democratically. The problem is that democracy is 
uncertain in its results and, as we noted, uncertainty is bad for financial 
markets. Technocracy is more reassuring: let the experts decide, they 
know what to do, citizen participation is not needed, we only need 
“ecological modernisation” governed by technocracy and big business 
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(Cadman ed., 2013, p. 18). The overarching role of technocrats, starting 
with central bankers, is the political side of financialization and the rule 
of financial markets on world economy. Once again, nothing lets us 
suppose that sustainable finance will be able to significantly change the 
situation. 
EU Reports are full of good intentions, but good intentions are not 
enough. Transition is immensely important for the future of humankind. 
A total change in the financial landscape implies a strong guide in the 
strategy of public intervention, which should be based on new rules, 
different behavior and a different general attitude towards the 
environment. Either there is a serious commitment to transition -which 
will imply major changes- or it stays only a formal gesture -and the 
threat of climate change will not be dealt with as it should. When 
humankind realizes this, it could be too late. 
28 
References 
 
Acharya, Viral V., Lasse H. Pedersen, Thomas Philippon, and Matthew 
Richardson. 2010. “Measuring Systemic Risk.” Federal Reserve of 
Cleveland Working Paper No. 1002. Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland. 
 
Aglietta, Michel and Étienne Espagne. 2016. “Climate and finance 
systemic risks, more than an analogy? The climate fragility hypothesis.” 
CEPII Working Paper No. 2016-10. 
 
Andersen, Dana C. 2017. “Do credit constraints favor dirty production? 
Theory and plant-level evidence., Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 84: 189–208. 
 
Andrews, Edmund L. 2008. “Greenspan Concedes Error on 
Regulation”, The New York Times, 23th October, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html. 
 
Aspromonte, Donatello and Andrea Molocchi. 2014. “Ambiente chiama, 
banca risponde?” Nuova Energia, 4-2014, http://www.nuova-
energia.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4198&Ite
mid=113.  
 
Atkinson, T. et al. 2013. “How bad was it? The costs and consequences 
of the 2007-09 financial crisis.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas SP n. 
20/2013. 
 
Barkawi, Alexander and Pierre Monnin. 2015. “Monetary Policy and 
Green Finance: Exploring the Links.” in International Institute for 
Sustainable Development. Greening China’s financial system, 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/greening-chinas-
financial-system.pdf. 
 
Batten, Sandra, Rhiannon Sowerbutts, and Misa Tanaka. 2016, “Let’s 
talk about the weather: the impact of climate change on central banks.” 
Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 603, 
29 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2016/sw
p603.pdf.  
 
BCBS. 2014. “The G-SIB assessment methodology – score calculation.” 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d296.pdf. 
 
Bearden, David M. 2012. “Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act: A Summary of superfund cleanup 
authorities and related provisions of the act.” CRS Report for Congress, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41039.pdf.  
 
Bernardini, Enrico, Johnny Di Giampaolo, Ivan Faiella and Riccardo 
Poli. 2017. “Gli investimenti nelle utilities del settore elettrico: 
implicazioni del carbon risk.” QEF della Banca d’Italia No. 410, 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2017-0410/QEF_410.pdf.  
 
Boulatoff, Catherine and Carol Marie Boyer. 2017. “What is the impact 
of private and public R&D on clean technology firms’ performance? An 
international perspective.” Journal of Sustainable Finance & 
Investment, Vol. 7, No. 2, 147-168, DOI: 
10.1080/20430795.2016.1251813. 
 
Bouma, Jan Jaap, Leon Klinkers, and Marcel Jeucken. 2001. 
Sustainable Banking. The Greening of Finance: Sheffield (UK): 
Greenleaf Publishing. 
 
Cadman Timothy ed. 2013. Climate Change and Global Policy 
Regimes. Toward Institutional Legitimacy, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
 
Campiglio, Emanuele, Antoine Godin, Eric Kemp-Benedict and Sini 
Matikainen. 2017. “The Tightening Links Between Financial Systems 
and the Low-Carbon Transition.” in Philip Arestis and Malcom Sawyer 
eds., Economic Policies since the Global Financial Crisis, Berlin, 
Springer Verlag. 
 
Campiglio, Enrico. 2014. “Beyond carbon pricing: The role of banking 
and monetary policy in financing the transition to a low-carbon 
economy.” Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working 
30 
Paper No. 181, http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Working-Paper-160-Campiglio-20142.pdf.  
 
Cass, Loren R. 2010. “The Politics of Climate Change.” Oxford 
Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, DOI: 
10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.112.  
 
CFGS. 2018. “Structural changes in banking after the crisis.”, CFGS 
Paper No. 60, Basel, https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs60.pdf.  
 
Covington, Howard. 2017. “Investment consequences of the Paris 
climate agreement.” Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, Vol. 
7, No. 1, 54-63, DOI: 10.1080/20430795.2016.1196556. 
 
Crotty, James R. 1990. “Owner–Manager Conflict and Financial 
Theories of Investment Instability: A Critical Assessment of Keynes, 
Tobin, and Minsky.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 12, n. 
4. 
 
Dafermos, Yannis, Maria Nikolaidi and Giorgios Galanis. 2018, 
“Climate change, financial stability and monetary policy.” Ecological 
Economics, Vol. 152, October, 219-234. 
 
de Mooij, Ruud and Gaetan Nicodème, eds. 2014. Taxation and 
regulation of the financial sector, Boston, The MIT Press. 
 
Dechezleprêtre, Antoine and Misato Sato. 2014. “The Impacts of 
Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness. Policy Brief.” Centre 
for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Impacts_of_Environmental_Regulations.pdf. 
 
Dia, Ezio and David VanHoose. 2013. “Using Pigouvian Taxes to 
correct Banking Externalities: a Cautionary Tale.” Mimeo, Baylor 
University, 
http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/193474.pdf.  
 
31 
Dombret, Andreas and Otto Lucius eds. 2013. Stability of the Financial 
System. Illusion or Feasible Concept? Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
 
EC. 1993 “Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment.” Lugano, 21th June, 
https://rm.coe.int/168007c079. 
 
Esposito, Lorenzo, Giuseppe Mastromatteo and Andrea Molocchi. 2018. 
“Environment risk weighted assets: allowing banking supervision 
and green economy to meet for good.” Journal of Sustainable Finance 
& Investment forthcoming. 
 
Esposito, Lorenzo. 2013. “Connect them where it hurts. The missing 
piece of the puzzle.” QEF della Banca d’Italia No. 151, 
www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2013-
0151/QEF_151.pdf?language_id=1. 
 
ESRB. 2016. “Too late, too sudden - Transition to a low-carbon 
economy and systemic risk.” 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/Reports_ASC_6_1602.pdf. 
 
EU (High Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance). 2017. “Interim 
Report.” July, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/170713-
sustainable-finance-report_en.pdf.  
 
EU (High Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance). 2018. “Final 
Report.” January, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180131-
sustainable-finance-final-report_en.pdf.  
 
Evans, Alex and David Steven. 2007. Climate Change: the State of the 
Debate, Center on International Cooperation London, 
http://globaldashboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/06/State_of_the_Debate.pdf. 
 
Faiella, Ivan and Francesco Cingano. 2015. “La tassazione verde in 
Italia: L’analisi di una Carbon Tax sui trasporti.” Economia Pubblica, 
Vol. 2, No. 2: 45–90. 
 
32 
FAO. 2017. The future of food and agriculture. Trends and challenge. 
Rome, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6583e.pdf. 
 
Fuller, Gary. 2016. “Air quality worsen in Greece as recession bites.” 
The Guardian, 30th October, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/oct/30/air-quality-
worsens-greece-recession-bites-world-pollutionwatch.  
 
G20. 2016. G20 Green Finance Synthesis Report. Green Finance Study 
Group, http://unepinquiry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Synthesis_Report_Full_EN.pdf. 
 
Galati, Gabriele, and Richhild Moessner. 2011. “Macroprudential 
policy—a literature review.” BIS Working Paper No. 337, 
www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf.  
 
GFT. 2018. Accelerating Green Finance, London, 
http://greenfinanceinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Accelerating-Green-Finance-GFT-FINAL-
report.pdf. 
 
Ghisetti, Claudia, Massimiliano Mazzanti, Susanna Mancinelli and 
Mariangela Zoli. 2015. “Do financial constraints make the environment 
worse off? Understanding the effects of financial barriers on 
environmental innovations.” SEEDS Working Paper No. 1, 
http://www.sustainability-seeds.org/papers/RePec/srt/wpaper/0115.pdf.  
 
Ghisetti, Claudia, Massimiliano Mazzanti, Susanna Mancinelli and 
Mariangela Zoli. 2017. “Financial barriers and environmental 
innovations: evidence from eu manufacturing firms.” Climate Policy 
17(sup1), S131–S147. 
 
Harding, Stephan. 2007. “The long road to enlightenment.” The 
Guardian, 8th January, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jan/08/climatechange.c
limatechangeenvironment. 
 
33 
HSBC Holdings plc. 2018. Annual Report and Account 2017, 
https://www.hsbc.com/investor-relations/group-results-and-
reporting/annual-report.  
 
ICBC. 2014. Impact of Environmental Factors on Credit Risk of 
Commercial Banks, Beijing, 
http://www.greenfinance.org.cn/upfile/upfile/filet/ICBC%E7%8E%AF
%E5%A2%83%E5%8E%8B%E5%8A%9B%E6%B5%8B%E8%AF%9
5%E8%AE%BA%E6%96%87_2016-03-19_08-49-24.pdf. 
 
IMF. 2015. Improving Public Investment Efficiency in the G-20 
(https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/090115.pdf)  
 
Johnson, Simon. and James Kwak. 2010. 13 Bankers. The Wall Street 
Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown, Vintage Books, New York 
(NY). 
 
Le Treut, Hervé, et al. 2007. Historical Overview of Climate Change. In 
Susan Solomon et al. eds., Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science 
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter1.pdf. 
 
Liebreich, Michael. 2013. “Financial Regulation - Biased against Clean 
Energy and Green Infrastructure?” Discussion Paper. WEF, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_NewEnergyArchit
ecture_DiscussionPaper_2013.pdf.  
 
Mastromatteo, Giuseppe and Lorenzo Esposito. 2016. “Minsky at Basel: 
A Global Cap to Build an Effective Postcrisis Banking Supervision 
Framework.” The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 875, 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_875.pdf. 
 
Mathur, Kalpana and Akanksha Berwa. 2017. “Sustainable 
competitiveness: redefining the future with technology and innovation.” 
Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, Vol. 7, No. 3, 290-306, 
DOI: 10.1080/20430795.2017.1300855. 
34 
 
Matikainen, Sini, Emanuele Campiglio and Dimitri Zenghelis. 2017. 
“The climate impact of quantitative easing.” The Centre for Climate 
Change Economics and Policy Policy Paper 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/ClimateImpactQuantEasing_Matikainen-et-al-
1.pdf. 
 
Mazzucato, Mariana and Caetano C.R. Penna. 2015. “Beyond market 
failures: The market creating and shaping roles of state investment 
banks.’, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper, No. 
831, http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_831.pdf.  
 
Mazzucato, Mariana. 2013. The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking 
Public vs. Private Sector Myths. Anthem Press, London. 
 
Millaruelo, Antonio and Ana del Río. 2017. “The cost of interventions 
in the financial sector since 2008 in the EU countries.” Banco de 
Espana, Madrid, 
https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesB
oletinesRevistas/ArticulosAnaliticos/2017/T2/files/beaa1702-
art10e.pdf. 
 
Molocchi, Andrea. 2017. “Polluters Make Others Pay.” Nuova Energia, 
No. 1 and 2, http://www.nuova-
energia.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5274&Ite
mid=145. 
 
Narbel, Patrick. A. 2013. “The Likely Impact of Basel III on a Bank’s 
Appetite for Renewable Energy Financing.” Norwegian School of 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 10, 
https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/227245/1013.pdf?
sequence=1. 
 
OECD. 2011. Towards green growth Paris, OECD Publishing. 
 
OECD. 2015. The Economic Consequences of Climate Change Paris, 
OECD Publishing. 
35 
 
Pasinetti, Luigi. 2009. “Introduzione.” Convegno Internazionale 
dell’Accademia dei Lincei “Gli economisti postkeynesiani di 
Cambridge e l’Italia”, 11th March, 2009, Rome. 
 
PRA. 2015. The impact of climate change on the UK insurance sector. 
London, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/supervision/activities/p
radefra0915.pdf.  
 
Rezende de Carvalho Ferreira, Maria Carolina, Vinicius Amorim 
Sobreiro, Herbert Kimura and Flavio Luiz de Moraes Barboza. 2016. “A 
systematic review of literature about finance and sustainability.” Journal 
of Sustainable Finance & Investment, Vol. 6, No. 2, 112-147, DOI: 
10.1080/20430795.2016.1177438. 
 
Rozenberg, Julie, Stéphane Hallegatte, Baptiste Perrissin-Fabert and 
Jean-Charles Hourcade. 2013. “Funding low-carbon investments in the 
absence of a carbon tax.” Climate Policy, 13 (1): 134-41. 
 
Scott, Matthew, Julia van Huizen and Carsten Jung. 2017. “The Bank of 
England’s Response to Climate Change.” Quarterly Bulletin Q2, 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2017/q2/the-banks-
response-to-climate-change.  
 
Serrano, Monica 2007. “The Production and Consumption Accounting 
Principles as a Guideline for Designing Environmental Tax Policy”, 
FEEM Nota di Lavoro 8-2007. 
 
Signorini, Luigi F. 2017, “The Financial System, Environment and 
Climate: A Regulator’s Perspective”, Welcome address by the Deputy 
Governor of the Bank of Italy. Rome, 
https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/interventi-direttorio/int-dir-
2017/Signorini_06.02.2017.pdf. 
 
Silver, Nicholas. 2017. “Blindness to risk: why institutional investors 
ignore the risk of stranded assets.” Journal of Sustainable Finance & 
36 
Investment, Vol. 7 No. 1, 99-113, DOI: 
10.1080/20430795.2016.1207996. 
 
Sinha, Sanskrity. 2015, “COP21: All about history, goals and timeline of 
Paris climate change conference.”, International Business Times, 30th 
November 2015. https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cop21-all-about-history-
goals-timeline-paris-climate-change-conference-1531067. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2000. Economics of the Public Sector, New York, 
W.W. Norton. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2010. Freefall, New York, W.W. Norton. 
 
TCFD. 2017. Final Report. Recommendations of the Task Force on 
Clmate-related Financial Disclosures, Basel, https://www.fsb-
tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Report-
062817.pdf.  
 
Thomä Jakob and Hugues Chenet. 2017. “Transition risks and market 
failure: a theoretical discourse on why financial models and economic 
agents may misprice risk related to the transition to a low-carbon 
economy.” Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
82-98, DOI: 10.1080/20430795.2016.1204847.  
 
Ulph Alistair and Laura Valentini. 2004. “Environmental Liability and 
the Capital Structure of Firms.” Resource and Energy Economics, 26 
(4): 393-410. 
 
UNEP-Inquiry and Ministry of Environment, Land and Sea. 2017. 
Financing the Future. Report of the Italian National Dialogue on 
Sustainable Finance, Rome, 6h February, 
http://www.minambiente.it/sites/default/files/archivio/allegati/sviluppo_
sostenibile/Financing_the_Future_EN.pdf.  
 
UNEP. 2011. Universal Ownership. Why environmental externalities 
matter to institutional investors, Geneva, 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/universal_ownership_full.p
df. 
37 
 
UNEP. 2016. The Principles for Positive Impact Finance—A Common 
Framework to Finance the Sustainable Development Goals, Geneva, 
http://www.unepfi.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/POSITIVE-IMPACT-PRINCIPLES-AW-
WEB.pdf . 
 
UNFCCC. 1995. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First 
Session. Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its First Session, Berlin, 6th June 1995, UNFCCC 1995 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf. 
 
UNFCCC. 2015. Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 12th Decembre 2015, 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.p.df. 
 
VV AA. 2018. Banking on Climate Change, http://www.ran.org/wp-
content/uploads/rainforestactionnetwork/pages/19540/attachments/origi
nal/1525099181/Banking_on_Climate_Change_2018_vWEB.pdf?15250
99181.  
 
Villeroy de Galhau, Francois. 2015. “Climate Change: The Financial 
Sector and Pathways to 2°C.”, Speech by the Governor of the Banque de 
France to COP21, 30th November, Paris: Banque de France, 
http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/spee
ch-francois-villeroy-de-galhau-climate-change-the-financial-sector-and-
pathways-to-2-c.pdf.  
 
Whalen, Charles J. 2017. “Understanding Financialization: Standing 
on the Shoulders of Minsky.” Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College Working Paper, No. 892, 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_892.pdf.  
 
Wolford, Elizabeth A. 2014. “Lender Liability under CERCLA: 
Interpreting the Security Interest Exemption Using Common-Law 
Principles of Lender Liability.” Notre Dame Law Review, 67 (4): 1161-
1213.  
 
38 
WEF. 2017. The Global Risks Report, Geneva, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf.  
 
Zlatic, Vinko, Giampaolo Gabbi and Hrvoje Abraham. 2015. “Reduction 
of Systemic Risk by means of Pigouvian Taxation.” PLoS ONE 10 (7): 
e0114928. 
39 
 
 
Quaderni pubblicati 
 
 
 
1. Innovation, jobs, skills and tasks: a multifaceted 
relationship. M. Piva, M. Vivarelli, Vita e Pensiero, 
maggio 2018 (ISBN 978-88-343-3654-0)  
2. A bridge over troubled water: Interdisciplinarity, Novelty, 
and Impact. M. Fontana, M. Iori, F. Montobbio, R. Sinatra, 
Vita e Pensiero, settembre 2018 (ISBN 978-88-343-3793-6)  
3. Concordance and complementarity in IP instruments. M. 
Grazzi, C. Piccardo, C. Vergari, Vita e Pensiero, gennaio 
2019 (ISBN 978-88-343-3879-7) 
4. Sustainable finance, the good, the bad and the ugly: a 
critical assessment of the EU institutional framework for 
the green transition. L. Esposito, E.G. Gatti, G. 
Mastromatteo, Vita e Pensiero, febbraio 2019 (ISBN 978-
88-343-3892-6) 
 
1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Printed by 
Gi&Gi srl - Triuggio (MB)  
February 2019 
DIPARTIMENTO DI POLITICA ECONOMICA 
Sustainable finance, the good, the bad 
and the ugly: a critical assessment 
of the EU institutional framework 
for the green transition
Lorenzo Esposito
Ettore Giuseppe Gatti
Giuseppe Mastromatteo
Quaderno n. 4/febbraio 2019
COP Esposito-Gatti-Mastromatteo 4_2019.qxd:_  13/02/19  09:39  Page 1
